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ABSTRACT Descriptive metaphysics investigates our naive ontology as this is
articulated in the content of our perception or of our pre-reflective thought
about the world. But is access to such content reliable? Sceptics about the stan-
dard modes of access (introspection, or language-driven intuitions) may think
that investigations in descriptive metaphysics can be aided by the controlled
findings of cognitive science. Cognitive scientists have studied a promising range
of representational advantages, that is, ways in which cognition favours one
type of entity over another. The notion of representational advantage is investi-
gated and some scepticism is expressed as to its appropriateness for use in
descriptive metaphysics.
I
Supplementing Descriptiûe Metaphysics with Psychology. Acluster of notions appears to play an important role in experi-
mental psychological explanations. (These are opposed here to
folk psychological explanations; in what follows, ‘psychology’
will be a shorthand for ‘non-folk psychology’.) The cluster
includes figure-ground articulation (Wertheimer, 1923), salience
(Talmy, 1983), prototypicality (Rosch et al., 1976), preference rule
systems that output default ûalues (Jackendoff, 1983: Chs. 7, 8;
1992: 46–48; Hoffman, 1998), selectiûe recruitment for functional
purposes, preferential lexicalization, core domain-specific theor-
ies (Spelke 1994), grounding of some semantical items in others
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), selectiûe access by conscious pro-
cesses, releûance (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 2002), among
others. The common feature of these notions is that they indicate
that cognitive systems have made a selection within the referents
of a mental representation between several available items or
types of item. I propose to investigate the case in which it is
assumed that the chosen item is adûantaged, as a member of a
certain ontological category, by studying some claims that have
been made about material objects as typically advantaged items.
The notion of a representational advantage is itself widely used
*Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, held in Senate House, University of London,
on Monday, 2nd June, 2003 at 4.15 p.m.
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in cognitive science (see Scholl, 2001 for an overview related to
objects and attention). It has at least a superficial analogy with
some philosophical ideas about the structure of conceptual
schemes familiar from descriptive metaphysics. For instance, it
has been held that particulars of a certain type enjoy a kind of
priority over particulars of some other type (e.g., there may be
an identification dependence of the second type upon the first;
Strawson, 1959: Ch. 1),1 or that some types of entities appear
natural from the viewpoint of naive metaphysics, as opposed to
others that appear contriûed (Goldman 1994: 45).
Indeed, the goal of the present study is an assessment of the
possibility of using the tools of psychological research for back-
ing claims in descriptive metaphysics. Descriptive metaphysics
can be characterized as a thorough description of the world as it
is given in our thought and perception; the world so described
may not be in agreement with the content of the scientific image
of reality. The methodological question one may ask is: from
where do we get such a description? In the literature, the pre-
ferred source of evidence in descriptive metaphysics appears to be
semantic analysis or phenomenological introspection. However,
these are unstable and uncontrolled methods. On the one hand,
there is a high degree of semantic and conceptual variability, even
in use by one and the same subject. And we have been warned
against taking linguistic surface form at face value, so that we
are sceptical about the type of information that we can extract
from ordinary sentences. (Do you really mean to say of the pre-
sent king of France that he does not exist when you say that
the present king of France does not exist?) On the other hand,
phenomenology can deliver illusory contents—we are not very
transparent to ourselves. Thus, we may want to look for tools
for making controlled claims about what people actually think
about or perceive that we can use within descriptive metaphysics,
and techniques that elucidate representational advantages appear
relevant. We may also hope to explain some of our conscious
1. It may be surmised that the ‘philosophical’ notions are explained by their psycho-
logical counterparts: philosopher’s intuitions in deciding which entities have a con-
ceptual priority may be shaped by philosophers’ cognitive makeup. I would not claim
that this has actually been suggested by Strawson, but in a sense his idea that asym-
metries in identification may be reflected in asymmetries in linguistic practices (e.g.
referential dependence) goes in the direction of an inference to the best (in this case,
cognitive) explanation of the latter by the former.
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(introspectively accessed) contents in terms of the functioning of
cognitive mechanisms, so as to flag warnings about the contents
we seem to access. Knowledge of the actual preferences of the
cognitive mechanisms will impose useful constraints on the
description of these.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the heuristic value of
representational advantages. Any such analysis raises empirical
questions. What, in each case, are the purported advantages?
Which entities are representationally advantaged? But broader
conceptual questions are pertinent as well. What is it for an entity
to be representationally advantaged? Can an entity be rep-
resented without being advantaged? How do we define the con-
trast class of non-advantaged entities? Is the notion of an
advantage unambiguous? Is it rational that certain entities, and
only they, are advantaged? Are there normative constraints on
advantages? I shall consider what appear to be the most urgent
problems. After characterizing through examples what advan-
tages are commonly meant to be (Section II), I shall decompose
the notion of an advantage along three main lines. We want to
understand what advantages are for, what gets advantaged over
what (Section III), and in which sense the detection of an advan-
tage for a certain cognitive system can allow us to make claims
about the representational structure of that system (Sections IV
and V).
II
Examples of Adûantages. In a first, rough characterization, an
advantage is registered whenever some entities or classes of enti-
ties appear to be systematically selected for representation over
other entities or classes of entities, or when the former enjoy
some differential cognitive treatment. The multifarious advan-
tages of figures in figure-ground displays provide one of the best-
known examples.2 They include the fact that the figure is more
readily seen than the ground, and its shape is kept in short-term
memory as opposed to the shape of the ground—indeed, accord-
ing to some authors, only the figure is assigned a shape. More-
over, boundaries in the display are considered to be oriented or
2. Peterson and Kim 2001 for a recent assessment.
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asymmetrical, in that, although they separate the figure from the
ground, they are assigned only to the figure.
For a metaphysically more interesting example, consider our
pre-theoretical intuitions about concrete material objects, how
we perceive them, and how we talk about them. Objects like
pebbles and tables seem to form the backbone of our ontological
structuring of the world. We believe ourselves to live in a world
of middle-size, concrete, rigid, moveable objects; if asked, we
would say that we mostly see entities of that sort. Construed as
a descriptive metaphysical claim, this appears to be largely
agreed, so much so that even so revisionary a metaphysician as
Quine could claim that humans are instinctively body-minded. A
certain natural view of ontology would have it that our world is
taken to be inhabited, prima facie, by concrete objects such as
pebbles and tables and objects similar to those, and that this
basic articulation informs much of our mental life. These
intuitions and philosophical refinements have ramified into
empirical research and generated hypotheses about ‘object
advantages’. It turns out that object names form a large pro-
portion of vocabularies in all languages, a fact which becomes
all the more evident during language learning (MacNamara, 1982;
Bloom, 2000). Infant cognition (Spelke 1994; Soja, Carey, Spelke,
1991) seems to be very sensitive to concrete objects. Not only are
these perceived, and very soon aimed at in grasping, but about
them infants appear to have quite clear ideas and preferences: their
perceptions and conceptions seem preferentially to represent
objects. And early language could be biased towards concrete
objects because perception and conception are (Bloom, 2000).
Adult perception and attention seem to fall pretty well in line with
this object prejudice: adults have systems devoted to identifying
and tracking objects. Finally, evolutionary psychological
accounts of the primacy of objects are relatively straightforward:
it is natural to claim that it is because our interest is focused on
ecologically salient entities, which appear to be massively of the
type of concrete objects,3 that we have evolved systems devoted
to identifying, tracking, and recognizing concrete objects.
3. A notable exception to this line of thought is Gibson (1986: 16): ‘We are tempted
to assume that we live in a physical world consisting of bodies in space and that what
we perceive consists of objects in space. But this is very dubious. The terrestrial
environment is better described in terms of a medium, substances, and the surfaces
that separate them.’
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It also looks as if the intuitive notion of a ‘concrete object’,
natural as it may appear, is skewed toward entities with very
specific characteristics that may be summarized in the feature of
wholeness. Typical concrete objects are whole objects. Wholeness
decomposes into two notions, self-connectedness and
maximality.4 Intuitively, an object is self-connected or of a piece
when, given any two parts of the object, there is a path joining
them that never travels outside the boundaries of the object; it is
maximal when it is not a proper part of another self-connected
object. Now, as Quine was fond of stressing when he proposed
his own moderately revisionary account, there is no particular
reason to claim that the material world is inhabited by whole
objects only. On the face of it, proper parts of objects exist, and
so do scattered sums of whole objects, as well as sums of proper
parts of possibly distinct whole objects. No matter if we never
think of them, those things are there whenever there are material
objects around. It does not take much conceptual stretching5 to
contend that if two tables exist, then so also do their respective
left halves, and so does the sum of the two tables, and so does
the sum of the left halves of the two tables. None of those entities
(different from the tables themselves) is a whole object. However,
these other entities have pretty much the same ontological
respectability as whole objects: they are concrete, spatio-tem-
porally extended lumps of matter, with a shape and a size. We
are not opposing whole objects to ephemeral or abstract entities,
such as shapes or spatio-temporal regions or numbers, but to
other ‘portions’ of concrete reality. The main difference between
these other portions and whole objects relates to the structure of
their respective boundaries. In the case of the table, the boundary
is self-connected and unitary, and it divides the object from an
environment which is qualitatively different from the object itself
(the boundary is a wood-air boundary at each of its points). In
the case of the left half of the table, the boundary does not always
divide the object from a qualitatively different area (it is at least
in part a wood-wood boundary); and in the case of the sum of
4. ‘Whole’, in the literature, is tacitly meant to indicate both self-connectedness and
maximality. But maximality is an oft-neglected ingredient.
5. As we shall briefly see in the next paragraph, the ontological innocence of sums
and undetached parts is not uncontroversial.
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the two tables, the resulting composite object has two discon-
nected boundaries.6 All these differences are interesting in them-
selves, and they appear to be exploited by vision and by cognition
in general; but they hardly mark a huge ontological difference.7
This indifference is at odds with the fact that whole objects are
salient in cognition. Whole objects seem to be singled out as a
privileged kind.8
Not everyone agrees about the ontological innocence of mere-
ological sums and of undetached parts. However, the issue of
object advantages lurks in the background of many metaphysical
discussions on parts and wholes. As an example, consider how
van Inwagen (1990) contrasted two rival metaphysicians, the
nihilist and the universalist.9 Both accept the existence of elemen-
tal ontological items, but they disagree on what exists in addition
to those items: the universalist bestows existence to any mereol-
ogical composition out of the elements; the nihilist denies the
existence of any such composition. Both positions are generally
assumed to be at odds with common sense, which is less ontologi-
cally greedy than the universalist and more generous than the
nihilist. Both the universalist and the nihilist have to complete
their stories with a psychological account of this discrepancy with
common sense. For universalists, any lump of sand on a beach
trivially ‘exists’, however disconnected and gerrymandered. So
6. Possession of two disconnected boundaries is not a foolproof criterion for disun-
ity: a sphere with an internal cavity has two disconnected boundaries and is a whole
object nevertheless. The invisibility of the internal boundary in standard conditions
‘corrects’ the problem such entities could pose to a visual system that has to compute
object unity by counting boundaries.
7. Creative ontologists have suggested other fancy types of individuals as contrast
classes for whole objects, entities that are aggregates of scattered portions of matter
in complex spatio-temporal patterns. However, undetached proper parts and sums,
which have no such temporal complexity, are intuitive enough to create an interesting
problem, without resorting to individuals that can be conceptualized only through
mildly complex definitions.
8. Claiming that naive ontology is skewed towards whole objects is not the same as
saying that it does not countenance some instances of concrete objects that are not
self-connected, or not maximal, or neither. We do have names for some scattered
objects, such as ‘flock’, and for some salient non-maximal (undetached) parts, such
as ‘handle’ and we can perceptually track and recognize flocks and handles, in a way
that makes one think that we have perceptual mechanisms dedicated to entities like
these (Hoffman and Richards, 1984; Giralt and Bloom 2000; Bloom 2001). Thus the
whole-object advantage claim should be restated as a relatiûe advantage.
9. I am not going to follow closely his formulation of the debate, and adjust it in
order to highlight the terms of the discussion.
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they must explain why those existing entities do not enjoy any
representational advantage. For nihilists, no lump exists, only
(mereologically atomic) elements do. But then not even a pebble
or a table exists. So they must explain why such non-existing
things are assumed to exist, and enjoy representational advan-
tages. In both cases we are left with the psychological problem
of explaining the belief that more things exist than are recognized
by the nihilist, and fewer than are recognized by the universalist.
Whatever the truth of the matter may be, it seems reasonable
to state that whole objects are indeed cognitively privileged by
us out of a set of entities that are not privileged, possibly not
even acknowledged. This means that whole objects might have
not been privileged, that is, that it is just a contingent fact that
they have been privileged. However, we need to proceed with
some care at this point.
III
The Adûantage Notion. Advantages are for a cognitive system
and are assigned to certain entities oûer other entities or would-
be entities. The first aspect of the notion (what or whom advan-
tages are advantages for) concerns the fact that advantages are
investigated and found in various cognitive systems. The pros-
pects of doing naive metaphysics through empirical psychology
would appear interesting if we found out remarkable differences
between the endorsements of, say, a subpersonal system and
those of conscious vision, or between those of human perception
and those of ape perception. We might lump together all the
cognitive systems that are not to humans consciously and within
a first-person perspective under the label of ‘alien systems’10—
the class being meant to include subpersonal systems. Suppose
that your visual system parses the world in terms of objects, but
your motion system parses it in terms of properties at places.
Can we say that two different naive ontologies co-habit in you?11
10. Although even within conscious vision one may observe different endorsements.
The world of conscious peripheral vision seems to fade into unstable, non-objectual
bundles of properties, with uncertain localization.
11. One side consequence that beleaguers cognitive science is the modern equivalent
of the Molyneux question: ‘visual objects’ risk being of a completely different nature
than ‘nameable objects’ or ‘tactile objects’, so that cross-disciplinary comparisons are
difficult to establish.
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Do the two naive ontologies highlight two different aspects of
one and the same reality? Are there ‘multi-sided’ representational
items,12 whose sides are exploited differently by different sectors
of cognition?
This type of potential opposition between naive ontologies brings
us to another point. When we discuss a given advantage we must
be clear in making it explicit not only what it an advantage of,
but at the same time what it is an advantage oûer. Circumscribing
the contrast class we have in mind is to be done simultaneously
with circumscribing the class of advantaged objects. Or course,
some types of advantages are not particularly interesting from
the viewpoint of descriptive metaphysics—for instance, if the sys-
tem advantages whatever is in the centre of the field of vision, it
might so do without showing any sensitivity to categorial differ-
ences. The interesting advantages are those which indicate that
an entity of a certain ontologically interesting type has been pre-
ferred over entities of other types.
If we look briefly at the philosophical discussion, we find that a
standard opposition is often proposed between concrete material
whole objects (‘substances’) and other classes of entities that are
alleged to ‘compete’ with whole objects on various grounds.
Objects have been variously opposed to—or equated with—
events, regions of space, (bundles of) properties, sequences of
object stages, sums and parts of objects, abstractions, and, as we
just saw, scattered sums and undetached parts of whole objects.
In all these cases, objects have been said to be primary, or
secondary,13 relative to the entities in the contrast class.14 And,
in each case, the contrast has illuminated some aspect of the
notion of an object. What kind of contrast classes do we find in
the psychological literature? Here are some examples out of vast
range.
Bloom (1996: 90) raises the question ‘what sort of entities are
naturally thought of as individuals’, that is, ‘entities that can be
12. Alvin Goldman suggested this possibility in conversation.
13. For instance, they have been said to be reducible to, or provide a reduction for
these other entities. However, most authors are adamant in claiming that if objects
are not primary in the ontological order, we still appear to pre-reflectively consider
them primary in the naive-conceptual or in the perceptual order.
14. There are other oppositions in the literature, such as the distinction between
propreties as universals and particularized properties: here however we concentrate
on contrast classes for objects.
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categorized, counted, and tracked over space and time’—like
dogs and mugs. He claims that ‘not every logically possible indi-
vidual is acceptable from the standpoint of human psychology’:
for instance, not every conceivable individual is such that we can
learn a name for it easily. We cannot easily learn names for non-
salient parts or gerrymandered collections, unless these things
behave in very specific ways. So the contrast class here is what-
ever is mereologically sub-objectual or supra-objectual. Soja,
Carey and Spelke (1991) claim that ‘children may approach the
task of learning language with a pre-existing set of ontological
categories’. A default rule would empower the baby who hears a
new word to assign it to the whole object category wherever it
appears to refer to anything concrete: ‘Test to see if the speaker
could be talking about a solid object: if yes, conclude the word
refers to individual whole objects of the same type as the refer-
ent.’ The contrast class for objects is cut within the class of con-
crete entities and includes loose portions of matter. The account
of perceptual tracking in Pylyshyn (1998) finds a special position
for object-like entities, the only ones that appear to be able to
seize perceptual indices. Object-like entities (Scholl, Pylyshyn and
Feldman, 2001) include figures on a computer screen (maximal
uniform connected areas, paradigmatically squares subtending
small visual angles) and contrast with parts or groups of such
figures. Scholl (2001), in a review paper on the advantages atten-
tion allocates to concrete objects, observes that ‘among the most
crucial tasks in the study of any cognitive or perceptual process
is to determine the nature of the fundamental units over which
that process operates’, and asks how ‘objects of attention ... [are]
related to other fundamental concepts, including locations, refer-
ence frames, perceptual groups, surfaces and parts’, and whether
there is a contrast between objects and ‘the individual visual fea-
tures which characterize them’ (2001: 3). So here the various con-
trast classes include features, locations, parts, aggregates, and
reference frames.
We could say, as we did in the case of the contrast classes for
objects in philosophical literature, that the differences between
the privileged objects and the members of the contrast classes
highlight different aspects of the notion of an object that is part
of the naive ontology that we are attributing to the system. How-




The Ambiguity of Adûantage Claims. Claims about advantages
may be construed as behaûioural claims or as contentual claims.
Consider this claim:
(a) Visual perception confers an advantage on three dimen-
sional, bounded, unitary solid bodies, moving in continu-
ous trajectories.
Interpreted behaviourally, claim (a) says little about perceptual
content. It states that external entities satisfying certain (clusters
of) properties tend to be successfully targeted in some perceptual
tasks. This is not a claim about visual ontology, but about the
responsiveness of our visual system to certain aspects of the
world. Interpreted contentually, claim (a) is a little more
ambitious. It purports to articulate the structure of the ontology
that is implicitly or explicitly endorsed by visual cognition. Now,
given that we can ascertain that it is entities of a certain type
that cognition behaviourally gives an advantage to, how can we
proceed and make the claim that cognition represents the world
as inhabited by entities of the type it advantages? How do we
derive a contentual claim from a behavioural claim?
The interest of the derivation lies in the fact that our state-
ments about ‘folk ontology’ are obtained by just unpacking state-
ments expressing cognitive content. If you want to know what
the visual world of the baby or of the chimp or of subpersonal
parts of yourself or of some other type of alien is like, you are
not going to stop at the registration of a mere regularity in the
relevant behaviour, nor at the description of the entities (in the
relevant environment) that this behaviour seems to be tuned to.
You want a statement to the effect that the world looks a certain
way to the alien. For instance, it is not enough to claim that
aliens respond with joy to the sight of a bright lemon. You want
to know whether they represent the entities to which they
respond happily as three-dimensional objects or as yellow circles.
The question is in part, but only in part, the methodological
question how psychologists can control the various parameters
that enter the assessment of advantages. For these parameters
can only be controlled behaviourally. Is the subject responsive to
object unity, or is it sensitive to the presence of a convex shape,
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which in a given experimental setting happens to be co-
instantiated with object unity? In order to settle the issue one
needs to identify a control situation in which the two features
are not co-instantiated. Much ingenuity has been devoted to the
issue of control, but control can extend only so much. When it
comes to very abstract categories, scepticism spreads across the
board. (Rubin and Kanwisher, 1986 on Chen, 1982 make an
interesting point about topological categories.) Generally speak-
ing, the issue here connects with the familiar one of the inscruta-
bility of reference.
However, the question is not how to scrutinize reference by
looking at the overt behaviour of subjects in experiments. We
may even assume that psychologists can ascertain which entities
are advantaged (that is, entities of which type). And, granted the
assumption, we can still ask whether there are reasons to claim
that, whenever perception so advantages a certain type of entity,
perceptual content represents the world as including entities of
that type.
A simple answer to the question of what licenses deriving attri-
butions of content from behavioural attributions of advantages
could consist in endorsing a straightforward inference to the best
explanation. The inference consists in claiming that, say, aliens
are responsive to objects because they represent the world as
inhabited by objects. We explain success in referring to objects
by the availability of object-structured content. We can thus con-
sider the behavioural claim as criterial for the corresponding con-
tentual claim. However, the possibility remains open that
advantages are allocated non-conceptually to certain entities.
Responsiveness to a certain property is not to be equated with
representation of that property. Non-conceptual responsiveness
may explain the behavioural allocation of advantages. Alterna-
tively, advantages can be said to be allocated (behaviourally) to
entities which are in fact described by perceptual content in a
way different from that which the psychologist would use for
describing them. The alien can (behaviourally) advantage objects
such as lemons either because it just happens to be tuned to them
non-conceptually, or because it (contentually) advantages rep-
resentations of those objects (lemons) as being yellow circles, and
it just happens that yellowness and rotundity, in the alien’s
environment, are jointly instantiated mostly by lemons.
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We can account for the non-conceptual allocation of advan-
tages to objects by referring to the internal features of the rep-
resentational system. We may invoke a theory of how a cognitive
system could compute the relevant information in the given eco-
logical contexts, and decide that a certain type of advantage, for
example the object advantage, is the most likely one. The object
advantage could be the most economical solution to a compu-
tational problem in a given ecological situation. This is tanta-
mount to claiming that, given certain internal features of the
representational system, material objects enjoy advantages which
strictly depend upon what they are, that is, upon the ecological
(hence non-conceptual) structure of the world. Objects would be,
so to speak, natural attractors of representational advantages,
given the existence of representational systems with certain
internal features.
Two things are relevant to the illustration of this possibility.
The first is the contingent fact that whole objects have natural
boundaries.15 The second is the fact that wholeness, in the sense
of self-connection and maximality, is not only pre-conceptually
given. It is also a ‘fixed point’ in the space of possible parsings,
and this is important if the interest of the visual cognitive system
is to work with a stable set of entry-level elements for further
processing.16 Call ‘objectual’ parsing a parsing into whole
objects.17 There is an endless number of divisions of the visual
field at the sub-objectual level to produce non-maximal parts,
there is an endless number of divisions at the super-objectual
level to produce scattered objects, and there is an endless number
that cuts across levels. But there is only one division at the
objectual level: the largest units that result from a sub-objectual
division coincide with the smallest units that result from a super-
objectual division. So if you consider a system that is supposed
to register divisions, it will find the fixed points in the mappings
15. Ayers (1994). Natural is here opposed to ‘conceptual’ or ‘fiat’ in the sense of
Smith and Varzi (2000).
16. Such a necessity was pointed out by Palmer and Rock (1994). They observed
that for more than half a century Gestalt psychology had ignored the fundamental
question of how the visual system can get the entry units that are then processed
gestaltically to constitute macro-units. Their proposal is that the system finds out
connected patches of uniform quality in the visual field and treats them as units. (It
should be added that these patches must be maximal.)
17. Plus the remainder constituted by the complement of their sum.
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from the space of sub-objectual divisions to the space of super-
objectual divisions precisely at whole objects. It is apparent that
Quinean objects (most of which are non-objectual in the defined
sense) offer in general no stable solution to the problem of pars-
ing. There are too many mutually exclusive ways to aggregate
zones in the visual field. How could the system choose among
them?
The possibility of saying that the objectual parsing is stable or
a fixed point depends of course, on pain of triviality, on
‘objectual’ being definable independently of ‘divisions’. But this
is exactly where boundaries enter onto the stage. For objectual
boundaries are independently defined as qualitative boundaries;
independently, and not, on pain of circularity, just as the result
of some computation on the maximality of parts of an entity
(say).18 In this sense, the fact that objects have natural bound-
aries can be exploited by a representational system in a pre-con-
ceptual way, as an element within a computation that looks for
a stable parsing. All the mechanism needs is an algorithm for
matching boundary discontinuities with fiat boundaries induced
by ‘formal’ wholeness (that is, maximality cum connectedness).
And in this sense the mechanism would not need a concept of a
whole object or a representation as of a whole object in order to
be sensitive to whole objects. Pre-conceptual mechanisms would
do the trick. The difficulty, perhaps, was sorting out the inner
structure of the mechanism.
We have thus provided a schema of what could be a non-
conceptual explanation of object advantage. The solution relies
on contingent ecological features and internal constraints of the
visual system. Given the constraints, and the ecology, the system
will end up advantaging whole objects.
These possibilities appear to motivate a sceptical conclusion:
in the presence of a non-conceptual explanation of represen-
tational advantages, we are not entitled to study naive ontology
cognitively when it comes to alien systems. This could mean
either of two things. Either there is no such ontology. That is,
the content of alien systems is not articulated in an ontologically
18. This is to say that all this, of course, is relative to an appropriate characterization
of the property which the object satisfies maximally. One should beware of trivial
maximalities, as defined in relation to properties such as the one expressed by ‘being
part of a part p of a stone’.
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meaningful way. Or, alternatively, there is an ontology for those
systems, but we cannot study it as it is inscrutable, and we may
mistakenly take it for something else. It further follows that
claims about ‘object’ advantages may simply be artifacts of the
psychological theory, posits that depend on the theoretically
loaded language (and conceptions) used by psychologists. In par-
ticular, such a language endorses whole objects (or any other
entity it in fact endorses); but the use of ‘object’-oriented lan-
guage may simply be loose talk when it comes to the study of
alien content.
V
The Inscrutability of Alien Content. The inscrutability of alien
content appears to be a harder problem than the problem of the
inscrutability of reference, which relates to non-alien foreig-
ners—people who speak a language different from our own. For
these are conspecific, and we can always try to learn their lan-
guage in order to understand what they mean by their utterances.
Or we can rely on our empathetic simulation of their understand-
ing, which is only justified insofar as we recognize them as con-
specific, and we may then be able to interpret the little
behavioural feedback we get from interacting with them.19 But
when we approach alien content we can only hope to be able to
see through a glass darkly. Here are two examples of the
difficulty.
1. In a classical experiment (Duncan, 1984) on object-based
attention, subjects are presented with drawings in which a square
(of varying size) and a line (of varying length) are superimposed.
The square has a gap that could lie either on its left or right side,
and the line follows an orientation that can slightly deviate from
the vertical. Some subjects are asked to judge about features of
the ‘same object’ (size of the square and side of the gap), other
subjects are asked to judge about ‘different objects’ (size of the
square and orientation of the line). It turned out that ‘subjects
were less accurate at reporting two properties from separate
objects, but were able to judge two properties of a single objects
19. I am only considered here justified empathy: it may well be that we mistakenly
empathize with aliens, and even with a pebble.
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without any cost: this has been termed a ‘‘same-object
advantage’’ ’ (Scholl, 2001:7). Now it is assumed that the square
counts as one object, the line as another, that subjects (subper-
sonally, in this experiment) register the difference and the super-
position, and that they compute on items that correspond to this
parsing. However, the results could be explained in an alternative
way if we credited the subjects with a different parsing, according
to which only one object is perceived, whose parts are the line
and the two halves of the box. The accuracy in reporting would
then be explained by a same-part advantage (the line is one such
part, and the relevant half of the box another). Advantages will
be ‘local’. How can we choose between attributing either of these
different parsings to our subjects?
2. In another classical type of experiment (Spelke, 1993) infants
are shown two screens separated by a vertical slit. A toy appears
from behind the left screen and then disappears behind it.
Another toy, indistinguishable from the previous one, performs
a similar show in relation to the right screen. The screens are
then lifted; in the control situation, two toys are left to be seen,
whereas in the test situation only one toy is left. Infants (and
adults alike) show relatively more surprise at the second out-
come. Now, they could have expected one single toy to be there,
assuming it could travel from the area behind the left screen to
the area behind the right screen without appearing through the
slit. Hence the results are interpreted as showing that infants
spontaneously take objects as moving on continuous trajectories:
objects do not jump metaphysically, as it were. But here is the
problem: a number of alternative ontological structures are com-
patible with the data (surprise at the one-toy display). As Hirsch
(1997: 410, commenting on Xu, 1997) suggested, the infant could
be a Quinean who views ‘any space-time portion of reality, how-
ever discontinuous and gerrymandered, as an object on a onto-
logically equal footing’. Surprise could be simply due to the fact
that Quinean infants ‘do not expect to be confronted with that
kind of discontinuity’ (ibid.)—in the case at stake, we may sug-
gest, they do not expect a scattered object to lose one part, and
the contrast situation of movement through the visible portion of
the background was never a possibility. We need an independent
motivation for assuming that the toy behaves for the child in the
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way Spelke suggests, that is, as a concrete object that does not
jump metaphysically. And this independent motivation can come
from the experimenter’s own ideas about what objects can or
cannot do, or what it is reasonable to expect the infant to refer
to. But then, aren’t we just ‘retracing’ the properties attributed
by the experimenter to the toy back into the content of the
infant’s mental state about it?20
VI
Conclusions. Charles Darwin wrote in is Notebooks that ‘he who
understands the baboon would do more toward metaphysics
than Locke’. But if object advantage turns out to be explained
to our satisfaction in a non-conceptual way, then we must con-
clude that the prospects of exploring the naive metaphysics of
aliens are less bright than we might have expected. We have lost
sight of a way to derive from a behavioural claim about object
advantage the contentual claim that could articulate the naive
ontology of the alien. In particular, empirical research about the
alleged content delivered by subpersonal systems turns out to be
uninformative. But then, if we also accept that the standard ways
of describing naive metaphysics are jeopardized by the unre-
liability of introspection and of semantic-driven thought experi-
ments, we leave descriptive metaphysics in dire straits. We can,
of course, go along with an ‘as if’ construal of naive metaphysical
claims for aliens, or accept less stringent methodological con-
straints on phenomenology, or accept the surface form of linguis-
tic contents at face value.
Another, more immediate, cautionary conclusion is that we
ought to beware of the very suggestive descriptions that we hap-
pen to find in psychological literature. Empirical research may
just project the common sense categories of the experimenter into
20. Paul Bloom (in correspondence) finds the suggestion that psychologists have no
way of testing these alternative hypotheses too strong. But no matter whether we can
come up with a test for Hirsch’s proposal, the problem is that such a test would only
settle the issue for one type of alternative ontology. But if there are countless such
alternative ontologies (and very many they surely are already, plus some fancier cases
philosophers have not invented as yet), then we need to test each of them. The metho-
dological burdens on an experimental setting meant to establish our ontological set-
up would became unbearable.
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the explanations of advantages. Entities that are seen as advan-
taged by the experimenter may simply not be endorsed by the
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